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Chapter 7 Friedman and the Walrasian Equations of The Natural-Rate CounterRevolution
7.1. Introduction
From the 1930s, economic controversy has been a tale of three cities (Chicago and the two
Cambridges) and three General Theories. In the 1930s, there were, in addition to the General
Theory of Employment (Keynesian Macroeconomics), two other revolutionary attempts to don
the mantle of generality: the General Theory of Method (the formalist revolution, involving
structural econometrics and Walrasian general equilibrium) and the General Theory of Value
(organised around the concept of monopolistic, or imperfect, competition). The Keynesian and
formalist general revolutions became symbiotic and dominated the post-war landscape of
economists. In contrast, the monopolistic competition revolution did not readily lend itself to
general equilibrium formalism and, so far, has yet to achieve its promise (Tinbergen 1967, 268).

Edward Chamberlin (1957, 296) described the focus of opposition to the last of these three
General Theories as "The Chicago School of Anti-Monopolistic Competition"; only then did
economists begin to refer to Chicago as a School (Stigler 1988, 150).i Later, the term
"monetarism" was coined to describe the Chicago opposition to the Keynesian General Theory
of Employment. For Chicago economists, the 1930s exhibited "an excess of originality" (Stigler
1955b, 301). The purpose of this essay is to discuss Milton Friedman's opposition to the
Walrasian component of the General Theory of Method.
Two of these revolutionary research agendas (Macroeconomics and Method) acquired post-war
hegemonic ascendancy. But the two most influential revolutionary economists of the twentieth
century were more united in their opposition to the General Theory of Method than is
commonly supposed. J.M. Keynes and Milton Friedman had similar - and sceptical - views
about econometrics. Keynes also informed Hicks that "Walras' theory and all others along those
lines are little better than nonsense" (cited by Skidelsky 1992, 615). Keynes (1936a, 177)
contrasted his own General Theory with a 'classical' caricature; Walras, he believed, was strictly
in this classical tradition.
In apparent contrast, Friedman (1968a, 8) constructed his anti-Keynesian counter-revolution
using Walrasian language: "At any moment in time there is some level of employment which
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has the property that it is consistent with equilibrium in the structure of real wage rates ... The
'natural rate of unemployment', in other words, is the level that would be ground out by the
Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations, provided that there is embedded in them the
actual structural characteristics of the labor and commodity markets [emphasis in text]". Later,
he augmented the quantity theory with the Walrasian equations of general equilibrium (1974b,
31-2). According to one of his most severe critics, "Friedman, like all mainstream theorists,
accepts the Walrasian system as the microfoundations of macroeconomic theory" (Davidson
1989, 9).
But Friedman's research has always been in the Marshallian methodological tradition
(Hammond 1996) and Alfred Marshall was regarded as the "patron saint of 'positive
economics'" (Clower 1964, 367). Robert Clower (1965) and Axel Leijonhuvud (1967)ii had
recently questioned the legitimacy of the Walrasian Keynesianism of the Neoclassical Synthesis,
and Clower (1964, 372) concluded that the Friedman and Schwartz research project was an
assault on this neo-Walrasian orthodoxy: their conclusions were "bound to be a bit upsetting to
those vision of the working of the economic system is informed by neo-Walrasian theoretical
conceptions, which is to say all but a small handful of contemporary economists". Friedman
(1974b, 159-60) was aware of this Walrasian dimension of the struggle for influence: "Tobin's
style goes further in Walras's direction than mine does ... this difference in methodological style
is an important reason why we seem to talk at cross purposes ... Patinkin, even more than Tobin,
is Walrasian, concerned with abstract completeness, rather than Marshallian, concerned with the
construction of special tools for special problems". Patinkin and Tobin (Friedman's Walrasian
critics) objected to the policy conclusions of the (Walrasian) natural-rate model. The purpose of
this chapter is to place Friedman's use of these equations in the context of his other statements
about the limited role that should be allocated to Walrasian-style thinking.
Friedman's words were some of the most influential words ever spoken by a President of the
American Economic Association (AEA); they launched the ongoing natural-rate research
project around which modern macroeconomics has been organised for the last three decades.
The natural-rate of unemployment is typically presented as a hard empirical constant, or as an
empirically valid variable that changes only slowly. It is a relatively unobjectionable concept, in
so far as it represents a speed limit, beyond which inflation will increase, and beyond which the
associated gains with respect to unemployment will be temporary. But it also supposedly
represents a gravitational force which ensures that disinflation will have only temporary
consequences: unemployment will, in time, return to its natural level (thought to be about 2% in
Britain in the mid-1970s, when the concept began to acquire overriding policy influence). The
apparent paradox discussed in this chapter is that Friedman was - and continues to be - highly
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sceptical of such empirical measures. He also described as "utterly unattainable" the accurate
measurement of inflationary expectations (the equilibrating variable of the natural-rate model).
Friedman's (1968a, 14-15) AEA Presidential Address was a critique of "Employment as a
criteria of policy" [emphasis in text]. The apparent purpose of his counter-revolution was
apparently not to launch a natural-rate estimating industry, but to suggest that using monetary
policy to target unemployment was "like a space vehicle that has taken a fix on the wrong star.
No matter how sensitive and sophisticated its guiding apparatus, the space vehicle will go
astray". Thus, currently fashionable monetary policy rules (which suggest that interest rates
should be fine-tuned to counteract deviations of current output or unemployment from
numerically calculable natural levels) represent a reversal of Friedman's counter-revolution.
They also represent (in Friedman's terms) the use of an abstract Walrasian concept in a practical
area where only Marshallian tools are relevant.
To avoid ambiguity in the use of the terms 'Marshallian' and 'Walrasian', this chapter follows
Friedman's (1974b, 143, 146, 159) use of these terms: the Walrasian approach is "concerned
with abstract completeness", in contrast to the Marshallian approach, which is "concerned with
the construction of special tools for special problems". Section 7.2 analyses Friedman's views
on the Walrasian system. Friedman argued that it was unfortunate that Walrasian economics
had overtaken Marshallian analysis. Formalism, Friedman argued, yielded few conclusions that
were susceptible to empirical contradiction, and tended to rely on assertions about inflationary
expectations that were empirically "utterly unattainable" to measure. Walras' "divorce of form
from substance had led to some "nonsense".
Section 7.3 places the Walrasian equations of the natural-rate counter-revolution in the context
of Friedman's analysis of the limitations of Walrasian analysis. The implication of Friedman's
analysis is that the vertical long-run Phillips curve is a "language proposition" while the shortrun Phillips curve is a "substantive" proposition. The important question is empirical: some
estimate can be made of a rate of unemployment to which the title "natural" can be attached; but
does this supposedly natural-rate exert any influence on the course of the actual rate? But this
crucial empirical question is rarely addressed by those who estimate natural-rates. Friedman
also stated that unemployment was a "highly inefficient method" of adjustment - although
increasing unemployment (to reduce inflationary expectations and shift the short-run Phillips
curve downwards) is the adjustment mechanism of natural-rate models. Section 7.4 provides a
brief outline of the process by which the natural-rate became influential in macroeconomics.
Concluding remarks are provided in section 7.5.
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7.2. Friedman on Walrasian Economics
Friedman (1996a, 1989) describes himself as "a long term Marshallian"; the label he put on his
methodology is "Marshallianism" (Hammond 1996, 30). One of Friedman's (1940; 1941)
earliest contributions to economic disputation was a critical review of Jan Tinbergen's
macroeconometric project; this was followed almost immediately by a review of Robert Triffin's
Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium Theory. Triffin (1941, 3) argued that the
"gravitational centre" of Marshallian economics was the industry: "What we might well now do
is to restate the whole problem in terms of the Walrasian, general equilibrium system of
economic theory". Friedman (1941, 390) replied that "For these problems, we must continue to
employ the Marshallian tools, until better ones are invented".
Paul Samuelson (1983, 7) recalled that Frank Knight (the doyen of inter-war Chicago) was fond
of exclaiming that "If there is anything I can't stand it's a Keynesian and a believer of
monopolistic competition". Friedman (the doyen of post-war Chicago) made his earliest
contributions to the Chicago cause in opposition to two of the General Theories spawned by the
1930s (the Walrasian approach and monopolistic competition). As he explained to his students
in the late 1940s, Marshall's Principles was "still the best book available in economic theory.
This is indeed a sad commentary on the economics of our time. Marshall's superiority is
explained by his approach to economics as contrasted with the modern approach" (cited by
Hammond 1996, 31). Yet, it was Friedman's AEA Presidential use of Walrasian language
which "undermined ... the whole intellectual basis of post war demand management by
government" [emphasis in text] (Laidler 1975, 45). A Marshallian persuaded the economics
profession that the "gravitational centre" of the macroeconomy was the Walrasian natural-rate of
unemployment.
Friedman (1953, 89-93) noted that "by slow and gradual steps, the role assigned to economic
theory has altered in the course of time until today we assign a substantially different role to
theory than Marshall did. We curtsy to Marshall, but we walk with Walras". According to
Friedman, the important distinction between "the conceptions of economic theory implicit in
Marshall and Walras lies in the purpose for which the theory is constructed and used". For
Marshall, economic theory was "an engine for the discovery of concrete truth". In contrast,
"Abstractness, generality, and mathematical elegance have in some measure become ends in
themselves, criteria by which to judge economic theory ... much recent work on Keynes's theory
of employment is Walrasian ... so is current economic theory in general". The fundamental
distinction between Marshallian and Walrasian economics "is treating economics as a serious
subject versus treating it as a branch of mathematics, and treating it as a scientific subject as
opposed to an aesthetic subject" (Friedman, conversation with Hammond 1990, 168).
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Much of the Walrasian formalist work took place at the Cowles Commission, during its sojourn
at the University of Chicago. The Walras centennial program in Chicago, hosted by the AEA,
the Econometric Society and the American Statistical Association, stimulated a wide revival of
interest in Walras; from the 1930s, general equilibrium was "in the air" (Jaffe 1935; Menger
1973, 50-1, 57 n24; Weintraub 1983, 17, 19, 37). Between 1946-48, Friedman was a frequent
participant at Cowles Commission seminars. His relentless criticism of their econometric
projects prompted Tjalling Koopmans to retort: "But what if the investigator is honest?" (cited
by Epstein 1987, 107). Koopmans was reported to be relieved when he and the Cowles
Commission left the University of Chicago, because his students and colleagues (such as Harry
Markowitz and Gerard Debreu) had their work criticised as being mathematics rather than
economics. According to Beckman (1991, 264-5, 253) the source of this antagonism was a
Chicago economist whose "star was just rising" and who later won a Nobel Prize. His identity
can be determined by reference to the period (1944-55) Koopmans spent at Chicago.iii
Certainly, Markowitz (1992, 286) concluded his Nobel Lecture with the recollection that
Friedman had attempted to persuade his dissertation committee not to award his PhD on the
grounds that portfolio theory was not a legitimate part of economics.
Oscar Lange's 1944 Cowles monograph Price Flexibility and Employment challenged the
Chicago view of general equilibrium theory (Reder 1982, 5). Immediately, Friedman (1953
[1946], 277-300) led the "Methodological Criticism" on Lange's "shackles of formalism ... the
analysis seems unreal and artificial ... more nearly a rationalisation of policy conclusions
previously reached than a basis for them ... not a shred of evidence is offered for them".
Friedman criticised Lange's "use of classifications that have no direct empirical counter-part ...
The resulting system of formal models has no solid basis in observed facts and yields few if any
conclusions susceptible of empirical contradiction". Friedman's reaction to Lange is interesting
for its discussion of the complications associated with monetary changes, and the impossibility
of incorporating an empirical counter-part to inflationary expectations: "An example of a
classification that has no direct empirical counterpart is Lange's classification of monetary
changes ... An explicit monetary policy aimed at achieving a neutral (or positive or negative)
monetary effect would be exceedingly complicated, would involve action especially adapted to
the particular disequilibrium to be corrected, and would involve knowledge about price
expectations, that even in principle, let alone in practice, would be utterly unattainable".iv
In Chicago in the 1950s, Friedman was "excessively negative" about the "sterile" and
"untestable" nature of general equilibrium analysis (Becker 1991, 143). But the year after
Friedman's methodological essay, Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu (1954) demonstrated the
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existence of a general equilibrium solution (with perfect competition and forward markets in all
goods and services); Walras increasingly came to be seen as the forefather of modern
microeconomics (Debreu 1984, 268; Schumpeter 1954, 827).v William Jaffe's (1954)
translation of Walras' Elements of Pure Economics was published for the AEA and the Royal
Economic Society; and Friedman (1955), as one of the leading methodologists of his era, wrote
a critique of 'Leon Walras and his Economic System' for the American Economic Review.
Friedman (1955a, 906-7) and Stigler (1949b, 38) noted that Marshall was Second Wrangler in
mathematics, and that Walras, in contrast, had twice failed the entry examinations for the Ecole
Polytechnique. Friedman (1955a, 904-9) argued that using "very elementary mathematics
indeed", Walras' work has led to a "misconception" of economic theory. His general
equilibrium system possessed "an extraordinary aesthetic appeal as a beautifully articulated
abstraction", but the failure to distinguish between the "task Cournot outlined and the task
accomplished by Walras ... seems to me to be a primary source of methodological confusion in
economics ... [Walras'] problem is the problem of form not of content: of displaying an idealised
picture of the economic system, not of constructing an engine for analysing concrete problems
... [Cournot's] goal was an analysis that would, given the relevant statistical material, yield
specific answers to specific empirical questions ... ". Walras' "divorce of form from substance"
had led to some "nonsense". The marginalist revolution assigned to rarete (marginal utility) "an
almost metaphysical role ... 'it has no direct or measurable relation to space or time' [Walras,
p.117] ... He says nothing more on the subject and simply proceeds to take for granted that there
is something called rarete which has numerical values that can be plotted ... emphasis on pure
form has an important role to play in providing a language, a classification scheme to use in
organising materials - labels, as it were, for the compartments of our analytical filing box. This
is Walras' great contribution".
One of Friedman's contributions has been to provide a classification scheme for all conceivable
inflation-unemployment observations. Those who have followed him have 'taken for granted
that there is something called the natural-rate of unemployment which has a numerical value
that can be plotted'. Friedman's essay was written after a sabbatical at Cambridge where, in
some powerful quarters, utility was regarded as a "metaphysical concept of impregnable
circularity", and where Friedman's methodology may have had an influence: "The hallmark of a
metaphysical proposition is that it is not capable of being tested" (Joan Robinson 1962, 48, 8).
The (rarely undertaken) test of the natural-rate model concerns its ability to attract the actual
rate.
Prior to Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money (1956), Friedman's (1953, 7) major influence
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was as a methodologist: "viewed as a language, theory has no substantive content; it is a set of
tautologies. Its function is to serve as a filing system for organising empirical material and
facilitating our understanding of it". It was "factual evidence alone" which "can show whether
the categories of the 'analytical filing system' have a meaningful empirical counterpart ... the
relevant question to be asked is usefulness and not rightness or wrongness". Theory was
perceived by Friedman (1976, 8) to be a series of substantial empirical propositions capable of
being predictively tested: "The definition of a demand curve is 'theory as language'. However,
the statement that the demand curve slopes downward to the right is theory as a substantive
empirical proposition. It has empirically observable consequences, whereas the definition of a
demand curve does not. Theory as language coincides with Marshall's engine of analysis. The
objective is to construct a language that will be most fruitful in both clarifying thought and
facilitating the discovery of substantive propositions" [emphases in text].
These demand curves are derived from a concept (utility) which may need no cardinal measure
to assist the analysis. The value of the concept of the demand curve lies in its ability to organise
"knowledge and thinking about a problem" and to provide qualitative and "quantitative
estimates of the effects of various changes" (Friedman 1976, 34). Friedman's framework
suggests that the long-run Phillips curve is a language proposition, whereas the shape and
gravitational characteristics of the short-run Phillips curves are substantial empirical
propositions. In the disinflation zone, the natural-rate model adds value by providing
quantitative estimates of the magnitude and duration of the unemployment required to reduce
inflation to an acceptable level. But it is these substantial empirical propositions which are
frequently less-than-adequately analysed by those who present estimates of the natural-rate of
unemployment.
7.3. The Walrasian Equations of the Natural-Rate Counter Revolution
Keynes (1943, 185; JMK XIII [1932], 406; [1934], 486-7) noted that "the weapon of
deliberately creating unemployment ... to confine the tendency of wages to rise beyond the
limits set by the volume of money ... [is a] weapon the world after a good try, has decided to
discard". He constructed his policy revolution against the "orthodox equilibrium theory" which
saw strong "natural forces" bringing output back to its optimal level.
But the Walrasian natural-rate model became the Marshallian "special tool for the special
problem" of formulating an appropriate policy response to the high inflation of the 1970s. The
model assumes (usually without any supporting evidence) that there exists strong "natural
forces" pulling output and unemployment back to their natural levels. The natural-rate of
unemployment is an abstract long-run concept; but the path towards it (if it exists and if it
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provides a magnetised trail for the actual rate of unemployment) is dependent upon the actual
short-run characteristics of the economy in response to 'unnatural' levels of unemployment.
Friedman (1974b, 150) specified that "The long-run equilibrium in which, as I put it, 'all
anticipations are realised' and that is determined by 'the earlier quantity theory plus the
Walrasian equations of general equilibrium' is not a state that is assumed ever to be attained in
practice. It is a logical construct that defines the norm or trend from which the actual world is
always deviating but to which it is returning or about which it tends to fluctuate." The
correctness of the hypothesis "is a question of fact to be determined by the consistency of the
hypothesis with experience".
The natural-rate model is a hypothesis to be tested (if it is capable of being falsified); it is not a
species of revealed truth. As noted above, Koopmans referred to the "Friedman critique" of
econometrics; Don Patinkin (another Cowles economist) described the "Friedman question" as
"under what circumstances would you abandon your pet theory?" (cited by Leeson 1998, 443-4).
Friedman (1974b, 1) claimed that the quantity theory framework "has probably been 'tested'
with quantitative data more extensively than any other set of propositions in formal economics unless it be the negatively sloped demand curve". The negatively sloped demand curve
coincides "with Marshall's engine of analysis"; but Friedman's (1968a, 9) quantity theory
contains the proposition that the "natural" rate of unemployment analytically separates "real
forces from monetary forces". Estimates of the Walrasian natural-rate of unemployment which
emerge from these "real forces" are rarely subjected to "Friedman's question".
"At any moment in time", if the grinding of the Walrasian equations were possible, then a
natural-rate of unemployment might emerge from those structural equations. But the
implication of Friedman's view is that the crucial question is empirical: is the actual rate of
unemployment gravitating towards or fluctuating around some estimate of equilibrium
unemployment? Before the natural-rate concept is invested with any validity it must first pass
the empirical test: is the actual rate returning to the natural-rate? There was no evidence to
suggest that there were strong gravitational forces at work in the British economy which were
returning the actual rate to the natural rate. The British evidence suggests that the natural rate is
an untestable and unfalsifiable concept - an estimate of some abstract measure of unemployment
that is graced with the unjustified title of 'natural'.
The natural-rate model implies (usually without any supporting evidence) that it is possible to
provide policy-makers with accurate econometric estimates of the magnitude of the natural-rate
of unemployment, and that this natural-rate exerts a reliably strong gravitational pull on the
actual rate. Measured unemployment (U) differs from its natural level (UN), only because of
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expectationary disequilibrium (i.e. inflationary expectations, ∆Pe, are not equal to actual
inflation ∆P). Thus, any 'unnatural' (UUN) divergence of U from UN is a function of the speed of
adjustment (α) of incorrect inflationary expectations.
The natural-rate model can be expressed as:
U = UN + UUN
UUN = f [ α (∆Pe - ∆P)]

(1)
(2)

While UN can be reduced by microeconomic manipulation (improving labour market flexibility
etc), macroeconomic policy can effect disinflation only by increasing U above UN; the speed of
reduction of ∆P and therefore UUN depends on α - the delusion variable. 'Unnatural' rates of
unemployment is therefore attributed to this 'delusion' and will reduce to zero as inflationary
expectations cease to be inaccurate. Equally, macroeconomic policy can not sustainably reduce
U below UN, without incurring the cost of accelerating inflation. But at the core of this model
lie two variables (Pe and UN) which, Friedman has argued, are either impossible or extremely
difficult to accurately measure.
Friedman's framework implies that the vertical long-run Phillips curve is a language
proposition; the shape of the short-run Phillips curve, and the gravitational pull of the naturalrate (and hence the speed of adjustment) are substantive propositions. The shape of the shortrun Phillips curve in the natural-rate model (the crucial mechanism for the disinflation
adjustment mechanism) is noticeably different from the shape of Phillips' (1958) and Lipsey's
(1960) curves as unemployment reaches four or five per cent. The data (in contrast to the
natural-rate model) suggests the existence of an important degree of downwards wage
inflexibility - there appears to be an expectations trap preventing inflationary expectations from
falling. As a substantive empirical proposition, the natural-rate of unemployment appears to be
model specific, and not a general property of the macroeconomy.
Friedman (1953, 165) cautioned that "Wage rates tend to be among the less flexible prices", and
thus unemployment was "a highly inefficient method" of adjustment, because the "adjustment
will not have been completed until the deflation has run its sorry course".vi Later, Friedman
(1977, 454; 1976, 215) thought that he saw in Phillips' work evidence of "deflation" and "falling
wages" at higher levels of unemployment. Phillips (1958, 283), in contrast, found that in his
"highly non-linear" relationship, "wage rates fall only very slowly". In Phillips' data there were
eight examples in the post-1904 period of falling wages (with unemployment ranging from ten
to twenty-two per cent); high levels of unemployment were more commonly associated with

10
positive rates of wage inflation. With this degree of downwards wage stickiness, the naturalrate model suggests that 'unnatural' levels of unemployment would persist for lengthy periods.
7.4. The Walrasian Colonisation of the Profession
Although Keynes was sceptical about the Walrasian approach, Hicks' Value and Capital (1939)
was self-consciously in the Walrasian tradition, as was Samuelson's Foundations of Economic
Analysis (1947).vii These two books, together with The General Theory, were the foundations
of professional training in the post-war period, and Keynesian macroeconomics came to be
perceived as "a short cut 'general equilibrium' theory". Since then, Walras and Marshall "have
been contesting for the souls of economists" (Tobin 1987, 118; 1972, 104-5; Hicks 1934, 347;
Dreze 1991, 7-8).
In his AEA Presidential Address, Friedman (1968a, 10) concluded that the monetary authorities
"cannot know what the 'natural' rate is. Unfortunately, we have as yet devised no method to
estimate accurately and readily the natural rate of either interest or employment". Three decades
later, this empirical measurement exercise was still out of reach: "As the coiner of the term, I am
disturbed at its widespread misuse and misunderstanding. The natural rate is not a fixed
number. It is not 6% or 5%, or some other magic number ... The natural rate is a concept that
does have an empirical counterpart - but that counterpart is not easy to measure and will depend
on particular circumstances of time and place" (Friedman 1996b). But Friedman's Address was
followed by numerous attempts to quantify this supposedly natural rate of unemployment.
Social Science Research Council funding for the Manchester Inflation Workshop began in July
1971; David Laidler (1975, 45), in presenting the "implications of [Friedman's] ideas for our
understanding of the British economy", reported that the "preliminary results of work in
progress at Manchester University" suggested that the natural-rate of unemployment was
"perhaps a little less than 2% in Britain, although such an estimate is necessarily subject to a
wide margin of error ... we shall nevertheless probably see an average of a million unemployed
for five years or more if we are to get the inflation rate down below, say, five per cent by 1980".
Laidler's judgement was that this was "too much unemployment for too long" and he argued
that widespread indexation might reduce the unemployment cost of disinflation.
Laidler (1976, 71) concluded that "we therefore have no way of putting the expectations
augmented Phillips curve to the test in a way which will generate results that command
widespread assent; although he hoped that reliable price expectations data might subsequently
be generated from survey data. Laidler (1975, 42) also discussed the possibility that the naturalrate "hypothesis" might be false. But in his Nobel Lecture, Friedman (1977, 459) declared that
"The natural-rate hypothesis is by now widely accepted by economists"; the economy would
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return, after disinflation, to the natural-rate. The policy choice was therefore a question of
timing: "when reporters and others ask how much unemployment it would cost to reduce
unemployment, I say to them, when did you last beat your wife? How much unemployment
will it cost not to beat inflation? ... if you continue to let inflation accelerate you are going to
have higher unemployment either way. So you only have a choice between which way you want
the unemployment to come. Do you want it to come while you are getting sicker or do you want
it to come while you are getting better?" [emphases in text] (Friedman 1975b, 32).
But this 1975 account is not a completely accurate representation of the vertical long-run
Phillips curve model (neither does it fully describe the positively sloped long-run Phillips curve
that Friedman later described in his Nobel Lecture). The higher unemployment that follows a
policy-induced increase in inflation is the product of centripetal force: the benign 'return' to the
natural-rate (which acts as a gravitational brake, halting the rise in unemployment beyond the
natural-rate). But the higher unemployment that follows from policy-induced disinflation is the
result of centrifugal force: unemployment increases beyond the natural-rate until the centripetal
force of error correction (with respect to incorrect inflationary expectations) pulls the system
back to centre at the natural-rate of unemployment. The first scenario is a constrained rise in
unemployment; the natural-rate model tells us nothing, ex ante, about the level and duration of
unemployment associated with the second scenario.
Ex post, the margin of error was revealed to be much wider than expected: "none of us expected
the deep and prolonged depression that ensued ... the experience has been chastening (Laidler
1985). Patrick Minford (1994, 230) recalled that: "At the beginning of the 1980s, I was helping
to push the incoming Tories towards the idea of a medium term financial strategy to control
inflation and I tended to think of the natural rate of unemployment as something that would not
be too outrageous a number. I don't think it ever crossed my mind that it was anything like three
million". Measured unemployment increased from 2.1% in 1973 to 13% in 1985 (3.2 million)
and remained over 2 million until January 1985 (Kavanagh 1990, 231-2).
It is often said that economists, like photographers, fall in love with their models; certainly
Minford appears to be prepared to acknowledge a personal forecasting failure in preference to
the idea that he was led into error by the natural-rate framework. According to Friedman's
(1968a, 9) exposition, the natural-rate of unemployment should have fallen as a result of the
labour market reform and diminution of trade union power of the Thatcher years. Any
framework that can lead such economist to "go astray" by "taking a fix on the wrong model"
must be regarded as suspect: either the natural rate inexplicably increased over six-fold in less
than a decade, or the model is an unreliable guide to policy.

12

There is another alternative. The gravitational pull of the natural-rate may be so weak that "full
adjustment to the new rate of inflation takes about as long for employment as for interest rates,
say, a couple of decades" - which was exactly Friedman's (1968a, 11) AEA Presidential
prediction. But in contrast to this pessimistic scenario, Patrick Minford informed the 1980
House of Commons Select Committee that (on New Classical assumptions), "the disturbance to
output and employment from reduction in the money supply and P[ublic]
S[ector]B[orrowing]R[equirement] would be minimal" (cited by Jay 1986, 208). Likewise,
before the same Committee, Friedman (1980, 61, 56) predicted that from "the best evidence ...
(a) only a modest reduction in output and employment will be a side effect of reducing inflation
to single figures by 1982 [... a temporary retardation in economic growth] and (b) the effect on
investment and the potential for future growth will be highly favourable". Unemployment was
"an unfortunate side effect of reducing inflation"; only rigidities stood in the way of a rapid
return to the natural rate of unemployment: "The mechanism causing the contraction in output is
the slowing of nominal spending in response to the slowing of monetary growth and the
inevitable lags in the absorption of slower spending by wages and prices".
Nearly all the discussion of the natural-rate model provided by Friedman relates to the
behaviour of the economy on the expansionary side of the natural-rate, where increases in
unemployment are constrained by powerful centripetal forces. The closest reference to policyinduced disinflation in his Presidential Address (1968a, 10) is the reference to monetary
authorities choosing a target rate of unemployment above the natural-rate: "they will be led to
produce a deflation and an accelerating deflation at that". In 'Wage Determination and
Unemployment' there are ten examples of unanticipated changes in aggregate demand; but the
first nine all relate to unanticipated increases in nominal aggregate demand (1976, 216, 222,
224, 226, 227, 230, 232, 233, 234). Friedman concluded that the natural-rate model was
validated by experience: any resemblance between the model and "what has been happening in
Britain is not coincidental: what British governments have tried to do is to keep unemployment
below the natural rate, and to do so they have had to accelerate inflation - from 3.9 percent in
1964 to 16 percent in 1974".
Few economists would object to this explanation; Phillips (1962, 1-2), for example, noted that
unacceptably high British inflation had been caused by the government maintaining
employment at an "extremely high level". But this reveals nothing about the existence (or nonexistence) of a natural-rate of unemployment. Neither does it provide any information about the
behaviour of an economy undergoing disinflation. Of Friedman's ten examples, only the last
discusses the main monetarist policy proposition, an unanticipated decline in aggregate demand:
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"Conversely let there be an unanticipated decline in aggregate demand, so that employers are
willing to hire fewer workers at each real wage rate as perceived by them. Workers searching
for jobs will find fewer offers that, on the basis of their unchanged anticipations, are attractive
enough to compensate them for giving up the search. The average time between jobs will
lengthen, and so will recorded unemployment. As the less attractive employment situation
becomes more widely known, job-seekers will revise their anticipation about opportunities,
become less choosy, and recorded unemployment will decline towards its natural level" (1976,
235).
It is not clear why unemployed job-seekers should take two decades to become "less choosy",
but this is the substantial empirical proposition of the natural-rate model. Perhaps this
individualistic explanation of the cause of unemployment appealed to Mrs. Thatcher (1995, 126,
95, 417) who echoed both the sentiments and the language of Friedman's (1968a, 14-15)
Presidential analogy of steering by the stars: "Alan [Walters'] view was that ... the monetary
base was the best, indeed the only reliable star to steer by ... True, inflation had moved up from
the low point it had reached after the [1983] election, and unemployment, always a lagging
indicator remained stubbornly high ... [but we] knew how to control the money supply through
interest rates and did so".
During the course of the 1979-83 Parliament, unemployment rose from 5.4% to 12.7% and
industrial output fell by over 11% (Kavanagh 1990, 231). In 1980, Nigel Lawson informed the
press that the "medium-term financial strategy is essentially a monetary - or if you like
monetarist - strategy" (cited by Congdon 1989, 231). But when asked in January 1985 by Peter
Jay: "with all-time record unemployment figures this week, have [we] yet reached that natural
rate", Mrs Thatcher replied "It's not a doctrine to which I've subscribed. It's one which I think
came in with Milton Friedman. I used to look at it, I used to look at it and not adopt it" (cited by
Smith 1987, 122). Shortly afterwards, the Financial Times ran a lead article under the headline
'Monetarism Dead - Official'. But some economists continue to estimate the natural-rate of
unemployment that supposedly results from unemployed workers loosing their delusions and
choosiness. Friedman (1976, 221) described as "somewhat ludicrous the confident statements
that many economists had made about 'trade offs' based on empirically fitted Phillips curves". A
similar (or harsher) judgement could be made about statements concerning the unemployment
costs of disinflation based on the natural-rate model.
The leading Keynesian-formalist described the "virus" quality of Keynes' General Theory
(Samuelson 1964, 315); but the 1976 edition of his textbook accorded only a footnote to the
natural-rate model (Samuelson 1976b, 835, n8). Shortly afterwards, however, that model
conquered the profession, in part, for reasons that Friedman found less than satisfactory about
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Walras: it was "an elegant and concise representation of the inflationary process for the longrun" (Taylor 1979, 108; Blinder 1979, 19-20). Robert Gordon (1978), and Rudiger Dornbusch
and Stanley Fischer (1978) incorporated the natural-rate model as the organising concept of
macroeconomics into the first editions of their intermediate textbooks. But the relevant
substantive empirical questions are rarely asked by those who present estimates of supposedly
natural rates of unemployment. The various editions of Gordon's textbook, for example, present
scientific estimates of the natural rate of unemployment in the United States from 1890 to the
present day, with no examination of the "substantive" empirical question (including "Friedman's
question").
Keynes had somewhat of a Cassandra complex and during the Monetarist decade many
Keynesians shared this fate. Followers of the formalist and Keynesian revolutions displayed
little immunity as the Old Keynesian era ended. For Keynes, the long run was a "subject for
undergraduates" (Joan Robinson 1962, 75; Eshag 1963, 100, n118); and Robert Solow (1987,
183) complained that the way macroeconomists used the natural-rate of unemployment was an
"intellectual scandal". But during the current period of Keynesian revival, the procedure of
comparing "magic" estimates of the natural-rate of unemployment with the actual rate of
unemployment to describe a monetary policy rule still retains an "amaz[ing] ... status"
(Rogerson 1996, 86). Ironically, these anti-formalist objections echo Keynes' (1939, 559)
complaint about Tinbergen: "The worst of him is that he is much more interested in getting on
with the job than in deciding whether the job is worth getting on with".
There are no truly general theories in science; only competing explanations which, for a variety
of reasons (not all to do with the 'classical' process) command varying degrees of respect among
practitioners. The natural-rate model challenged its primary adversary, the high inflation tradeoff interpretation of the Phillips curve, and is now challenged by models which invoke
hysteresis, implicit contracts, insiders and outsiders, an expectations trap, efficiency wages etc.
Not all of these models deny that "at any point in time" (to use Friedman's phrase) a natural-rate
of unemployment might emerge from the Walrasian equations; but they tend to deny that the
gravitational pull of any particular natural-rate is stronger than the gravitational pull of the
actual rate of unemployment (Phelps 1996).viii The positive co-movements of inflationunemployment observations in the 1960s appeared to be a vindication of the power of the
equilibrating forces of the natural-rate model; and this led to a widely-held conviction that these
equilibrating forces could be relied upon (in the disinflation zone) as unemployment increased
in the 1970s and 1980s. But the forces set up by both inflation and policy-induced recession
seem to resemble unpredictable chain reactions rather than the attractive equilibrating forces of
the natural-rate model - causing some Monetarists to question the validity of their earlier policy
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optimism.
For Alfred Marshall (1920, 564) "The most valuable of all capital is that invested in human
beings"; and increasing unemployment above the natural-rate tends to reduce the stock of
human capital (thus increasing the natural-rate), leaving a large pool of outsiders who have only
a limited ability to affect the wages of insiders. Thus the idea of a unique and stable equilibrium
configuration exerting an all-powerful influence on the actual course of unemployment has been
challenged by the idea that the natural-rate limps behind, and tracks, the actual rate, with (in
Keynes' phrase) "not so lame a foot" (JMK XXII [1940], 120-1).
7.5. Concluding Remarks
In Stigler's (1983c, 210) judgement, had Friedman been a Walrasian, not a Marshallian, much of
the Chicago research program would, he judged, have been thwarted.ix But as Harry Johnson
(1971) pointed out, the natural-rate model is silent about the short run (the speed and
effectiveness of unemployment-induced disinflation): "The most serious defects of the
Monetarist counter-revolution from the academic point of view are, on the one hand, the
abnegation of the restated quantity theory of money from the responsibility of providing a theory
of the determination of prices and output [analysing the supply response of the economy to
monetary impulses ... whether monetary changes affected prices or quantities] and on the other
hand, its continuing reliance on the methodology of positive economics ... Personally, I expect
[Monetarism] to peter out".
After Friedman's AEA Address, Johnson (a Chicago colleague) and Patinkin (an ex-Chicago
colleague) became two of Friedman's most bitter adversaries. Patinkin (1969, 1974) focused on
the supposedly bogus role of an inter-war Chicago oral quantity theory tradition, while Johnson
(1970, 85-86, 107, 48) suggested that Friedman had constructed his counter-revolution by
imitating the tactics of the Keynesian revolution: "My personal hypothesis is that, as a result of
his studies of the Marshallian demand curve and his year as a visitor at Cambridge, Friedman
became enamoured of the 'Cambridge oral tradition' as a concept permitting the attribution to an
institution of a wisdom exceeding that displayed in its published works, and unconsciously stole
a leaf from Cambridge's book for the benefit of his own institution". With respect to Friedman,
Johnson (1971) concluded that "one should not be too fastidious in condemnation of the
techniques of scholarly chicanery to promote a revolution or counter-revolution in economic
theory".
The truth-content of Friedman's 'oral tradition' continues to generate passionate scholarly
interest; often involving speculation about what Johnson described as the "motivational
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construction" behind Friedman's monetarist counter-revolution (Parkin 1986; Patinkin 1986;
Steindl 1990; Tavlas 1998a and b; Laidler 1993, 1998a and b; Leeson 1998). It certainly
appears that Friedman and Stigler brought a considerable degree of sociological perceptiveness
to their assault on (and defence of) various aspects of economic orthodoxy. Friedman enhanced
his policy-revolution by embracing the language of his opponents (IS-LM, econometrics,
income-expenditure, money demand); a language that he was often sceptical about. As a
language revolution, the natural-rate model is comparable, in terms of influence, to the
Keynesian revolution that it sought to overthrow.
Friedman's macroeconomics was a continuation of the business cycle research associated with
Arthur Burns and W.C. Mitchell that was undertaken at the National Bureau of Economic
Research. Koopmans (1947) savaged the Burns-Mitchell research methods as "measurement
without theory".x In reply, Friedman (1950, 489) noted (in defence of Mitchell, his mentor) that
the failure to use high status modern language could destroy almost completely the influence of
an economist. Friedman reflected that Mitchell's lack of a "more direct, obvious and farreaching influence" (in a profession increasingly dominated by Walrasians and Keynesians)
could be explained by his "own attitude towards his empirical work as expressed in his research
program ... the elaborately casual language in which it is presented, and the extent to which its
abstract elements are concealed ... He uses none of the jargon we have grown so fond of".
Did Friedman construct the natural-rate model so as to maximise its appeal to an audience that
was captivated by high status Walrasian language? Or are those who estimate natural-rate
models "Bastard Monetarists". It is unlikely that there will ever be a consensus about such
motivational questions. Certainly, Friedman's (1968b, 5, n2) engagement with the economics
profession was undertaken with strategic considerations in mind - against the "conditioned
reflex[es]" of "entrenched Keynesianism". Equally, the natural-rate model appears to be a
carefully constructed Chicago candidate, designed to challenge macroeconomic orthodoxy.
There are similarities, even of language, between Walras' marginalist revolt against the widelyaccepted labour theory of value, and Friedman's natural-rate revolt against the Keynesian
hegemony: "any value in exchange, once established, partakes of the character of a natural
phenomenon, natural in its origins, natural in its manifestations and natural in essence" (Walras
1954, 69). In constructing his counter-revolution, Friedman (1974a), a self confessed "collector
of schools", was behaving as if he were a self-conscious revolutionary, aware of these historical
precedents. In preparing his review of Walras, Friedman (1955, 907, n7) had access to a (then)
unpublished doctoral dissertation on The Rise of the Marginal Utility School, 1870-89, by a
Chicago student, Richard Howey. According to Howey (1989, xxiii, 38), Walras "had a plan
for scientific revolution ... Later he sensed correctly that if he was to 'assume' measurability, the
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less said about it the better".
Friedman (1953, 7) described theory as a "filing system", and the great contribution of the
natural-rate concept is in providing a "filing system" for all conceivable inflationunemployment observations, even if the natural-rate model remains unfalsifiable and untestable.
Indeed, many macroeconomists assume measurability; or rather assume that estimates of the
natural rate (however derived) exert some gravitational pull on the actual rate.
Monetary targeting may have petered out - but the Monetarist natural-rate model remains at the
core of applied macroeconomics. This was, in part, because a Marshallian had placed a
Walrasian concept at the core of an increasingly Walrasian discipline; despite his belief that
Walrasian analysis has "value for a very different purpose. It is an extremely useful abstract
conception to bring out the logic of the interrelation of the price system; [but] it cannot be used
to analyse a concrete problem" (Friedman 1976, 26).xi No doubt, fancier econometric footwork
will continue to produce estimates of the natural-rate of unemployment. But these estimates
will serve to mislead policy makers until the "concrete problem" of the gravitational pull on the
actual rate is successfully addressed.
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NOTES
i. Stigler (1962d, 71) thought the title invited a "slovenly stereotype"; it was also
geographically inaccurate in that Friedman, he rather provocatively claimed,
was the leader of the "Berkeley-Cambridge axis".
ii. Certainly, Leijonhuvud (1965) made a favourable impression on Friedman
(1974b, 16, n7).
iii. Rose Friedman felt she had been the victim of "sex discrimination" at
Koopmans' hands when he had her removed from their joint office shortly after
being appointed to the War Shipping Board: "It colored my opinion of Tjalling
then and later when, for some years, he was a colleague of Milton's at the
University of Chicago" (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 109-110).
iv. Chicago economists continued to despair of the theory of expectations: "the
promised land to some economists and a mirage to others. The reviewer must admit
that he leans towards the latter view: much of the literature on expectations consists of
obvious and uninformative generalisations of static analysis". With respect to "the
revision of anticipations ... progress depends much more on the accumulation of data
(of a type almost impossible to collect!) than on an increase in the versatility of our
technical apparatus" (Stigler 1941, 358-9; see also Schultz 1949; Woking 1949; Boulding
1949; Norton 1949). Phillips solved the problem of the measurement of adaptive
inflationary expectations for Friedman in 1952; Friedman was so impressed that twice,
in 1955 and 1960, he attempted to recruit Phillips to the University of Chicago
(Hammond 1996, 123, n15).
v. Schumpeter formed this judgement about the seminal importance of Walras' work in
1908, if not before (Hutchison 1953, 191-3). Also, in the 1930s, von Neumann and Wald
published proofs of the existence of general equilibrium (Weintraub 1983; Debreu
1987).
vi. In an earlier attempt to provide a guide to "long-run objectives", Friedman
(1953 [1948], 133, 144) stated that "Under existing circumstances, when many
prices are moderately rigid, at least against declines, the monetary and fiscal
framework described above cannot be expected to lead to reasonably full
employment of resources ... The brute fact is that a rational economic program
... must have flexibility of prices (including wages) as one of its cornerstones".
vii. Paul Samuelson (1967a, 113) was a leading proponent of these three
General Theory revolutions. In his essay in honour of Edward Chamberlin,
Samuelson (just prior to Friedman's Presidential Address), stated that "a proper
understanding of general equilibrium [is necessary] ... to attain ... an
understanding of partial equilibrium".
viii. According Edmund Phelps (1996), the co-author of the natural-rate model,
the natural-rate is a weak, not a strong, attractor; the system is perceived to be
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path-dependent.
ix. Referring to the economic analysis of political institutions, Stigler commented that
had Friedman "been what he likes to call a Walrasian instead of a Marshallian, the
intellectual atmosphere would have been very inhospitable and uncordial to this kind
of development". Stigler (1939, 471) also concluded that "The general equilibrium
method is not fertile: we sacrifice content to formal generality until we achieve the
state of the perfect dilettante, and know nothing about everything".
x. The disinflation component of the natural-rate model could be described as
theory without adequate measurement.
xi. Friedman (1976, 25-6) was discussing demand curves: the Walrasian
demand curve was derived by "mathematical economists" who were "unwilling
to put anything" into the "Everything else in the world" category.

